Ahmed Chaudhry

Hi, welcome to my website!

I am a Ph.D. Economics candidate at the University of Oklahoma (OU), expecting to graduate in May 2024. I work on applied micro and macro issues focusing on political economy, development, and public economics.

My Ph.D. dissertation includes three essays: the effect of US state-level campaign contribution laws on welfare policy, the relationship between political ideology and productive capabilities (long-run development), and how political ideology affects IMF program participation and conditionalities and how IMF program and conditions, in turn, affect political ideology.

I have also taught three courses (seven times) at OU as a principal instructor. These include Principles of Microeconomics (twice), Principles of Macroeconomics (four times), and Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (once). I also have two years of experience as a teaching assistant. Please click on the link to access my teaching dossier (statement of teaching philosophy, sample course outlines, and student evaluations) [Link].

I am available for interviews in the 2023-24 job market.

In my free time, I like to read, play Xbox, or make travel plans with my family.

*Note:* Please click on HTML to access paper drafts.

Selected Research

2024

Do Limits to Campaign Contribution Laws Affect Welfare Policy? Evidence from the US States

Ahmed Chaudhry

Job Market Paper, 2024

Abs HTML

How do campaign contribution laws affect pro-welfare policies? The US political system is highly unequal as policy preferences of high-income citizens are often prioritized compared to that of low-income groups. Therefore, it is widely believed that interest groups – corporations, PACs, and labor unions – employ campaign contributions as a bargaining tool to obtain access, favor, or vote by political candidates. Evidence shows that restricting money in politics via stricter campaign contribution laws can reduce the bargaining power of interest groups over candidates and increase the say of low-income groups in policy matters. Therefore, the effect of stricter contribution laws should also manifest as a shift towards relatively pro-welfare policies. This paper analyzes the relationship between stricter campaign contribution laws and pro-welfare policy across the state-wide legislative races from 1980 to 2018, exploiting the heterogeneity of laws across the US states. The legislative power of state representatives on minimum wage and earned income tax credit policies makes them a good proxy of a state’s welfare policy; alternative welfare policy proxies are also employed. The empirical results from the two-way fixed-effects model and the interactive fixed-effects counterfactual estimator indicate that stricter campaign contribution laws lead to higher minimum wage at the state level. Not as strong, but the estimates also suggest that more stringent contribution laws in a state result in a relatively generous EITC rate as a percentage of the federal rate. The effect of stricter laws on welfare policy generosity is also evident when alternative state welfare policy proxies are used. The empirical estimates withstand a variety of robustness tests.